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A structural attack to the DME-(3, 2, q) cryptosystem.
Martin Avendan˜o, Miguel Marco
Abstract
We present a structural attack on the DME cryptosystem with paramenters
(3, 2, q). The attack recovers 10 of the 12 coefficients of the first linear map. We
also show that, if those 12 coefficients were known, the rest of the private key
can be efficiently obtained by solving systems of quadratic equations with just
two variables.
1. Introduction
DME stands for “double matrix exponentiation”. It is a family of multivari-
ate encryption primitives over finite fields, parametrized by two integers and a
field size (in bits). It was developed by Luengo, and the version with parame-
ters (3, 2, 248) was presented to the NIST call for quantum-resistant public-key
cryptographic algorithms [1].
The encryption map consists on a composition of three secret linear maps
and two public matrix exponentiations, defining a polynomial map with very
high degree, and moderated number of monomials. This map which can be
inverted provided we know the secret linear maps.
During the revision process at NIST, Weullens claimed to have found an
attack against DME-(3, 2, 248) consisting on using Weil descent to convert the
map in a quartic one over F2 (with a much larger set of variables), and then
decompose it in two quadratic ones. However, his claims about the complexity
and/or feasibility of such an attack could not be proved (see [2]).
Later, Weullens proposed another attack ([3], [4]) against the submitted
implementation that took advantage of the lack of a proper padding. This
attack used 224 decryption queries, and analyzed the cases where the decryption
resulted in an error. It was practical, but did not essentially break the underlying
mathematical problem, so it could be prevented by using a secure padding.
Here we present a structural attack against DME-(3, 2, q) that reduces the
difficulty of recovering the private key from the public one from the claimed
256 bits to just log2(q
2). It is completely passive in the sense that it does not
require any interaction, just the knowledge of the public key. The attack does
not rely on any implementation details, since it considers only the underlying
mathematical problem.
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2. Description of the system
We first describe the DME cryptosystem. We focus only on the mathemat-
ical description, ignoring all the implementation details (such as how bits are
transformed into elements of Fq, padding, etc).
2.1. Setup
The system requires a common setup for all users, consisting on the following:
• Two positive integers m ≥ n.
• A finite field Fq of characteristic p.
• An explicit isomorphism of Fq-vector spaces F
n
q
∼= Fqn .
• An explicit isomorphism of Fq-vector spaces F
m
q
∼= Fqm .
• Am×mmatrix E, whose nonzero entries are powers of p, that is invertible
modulo qn − 1, and whose rows have only two nonzero. entries.
• A n×n matrix F , whose nonzero entries are powers of p, that is invertible
modulo qm − 1, and whose rows have only two nonzero entries.
• A permutation map M : Fnmq → F
nm
q such that
M((Fnq \ {0})
m) ⊆ (Fmq \ {0})
n.
For the implementation submitted to the NIST call the following choices
were made:
• m = 3, n = 2.
• The field Fq is the field of 2
48 elements, represented as polynomials in
F2[x] modulo the polynomial x
48 + x28 + x27 + x+ 1.
• The identification is done by considering Fq2 as the polynomials in Fq[T ]
modulo T 2 + a · T + b, with
a = x43 + x38 + x36 + x34 + x29 + x26 + x25 + x24 + x23 + x22 + x21 +
x20 + x19 + x13 + x9 + x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1
b = x47+x46+x45+x43+x40+x39+x38+x37+x35+x31+x30+x27+
x26+x24+x23+x22+x21+x18+x17+x16+x14+x9+x8+x7+x3+x2+1
and taking coordinates in the basis (1, T ).
• The identification is done by considering Fq3 as the polynomials in Fq[S]
modulo S3 + c · S2 + d · S + e with
c = x43+x42+x41+x40+x38+x37+x36+x34+x33+x29+x26+x24+
x22+x20+x19+x17+x15+x14+x13+x12+x11+x8+x5+x3+x2+x.
2
d = x46+x45+x44+x41+x38+x37+x33+x32+x31+x30+x25+x21+
x20+x17+x16+x15+x14+x12+x10+x9+x8+x7+x4+x3+x2+x+1
e = x47 + x46 + x42 + x39 + x38 + x35 + x32 + x26 + x25 + x24 + x23 +
x20+x19+x17+x15+x14+x13+x12+x11+x9+x8+x6+x5+x2+x
and taking coordinates in the basis (1, S, S2).
• The matrix E =

 2
24 259 0
221 0 228
0 229 265


• The matrix F =
(
250 224
27 288
)
• M is the identity.
2.2. Matrix exponentiations
The scheme makes use of a special kind of maps called matrix exponen-
tiations. Consider a vector x¯ = (x1 . . . , xm) ∈ (F
∗
qn)
m, and the matrix E
defined above. We define the vector x¯E := (xE111 · x
E12
2 · · ·x
E1m
m , . . . , x
Em1
1 ·
xEm22 · · ·x
Emm
m ).
Analogously, we define a map (F∗qm)
n → (F∗qm)
n by using the matrix F .
It is easy to check that these are polynomial maps, even considered as maps
from Fnmq to F
nm
q (by composing with the isomorphisms fixed in the setup). It is
also easy to check that the inverse matrices (mod qn−1 and qm−1 respectively)
determine inverse maps.
By abuse of notation, we use the same letter to represent both the matrix
and the corresponding map.
2.3. Keys and encryption/decryption maps
With this setup, the private key is a triple of invertible nm × nm matri-
ces over Fq, (L1, L2, L3) such that L1 is a diagonal sum of m square blocks
L11, . . . , L1m of size n×n; L2 and L3 are diagonal sums of n blocks (L21, . . . , L2n
and L31, . . . , L3n respectively) of size m ×m. They can be regarded as linear
maps Fnmq → F
nm
q .
Once chosen these matrices, we can consider the following composition of
maps
F
nm
q F
nm
q F
nm
q F
nm
q F
nm
q F
nm
q
F
m
qn F
m
qn F
n
qm F
n
qm
L1
∼=
E
∼=
L2◦M
∼=
F
∼=
L3
3
The result is a multivariate polynomial map from Fnmq to itself. In the
expanded expression of this map, the exponents that appear at the end depend
only on the entries of E and F , hence are public. The public key will be the
coefficients that appear in that expression. The structure of the system has been
carefully designed to ensure that the number of monomials in this expansion is
not too large.
Note that each step in the composition is invertible (assuming we stay always
inside (F∗qn)
m and (F∗qm)
n at the steps E and F respectively) by using the
inverses of the involved matrices. That is, the whole map can be efficiently
inverted if we know the private key.
3. Malleability of the private key
In this section we show how different private keys may correspond to the
same public key. This fact will be used to assume that the private key has a
special form.
From now on, we assume that n = 2 and m = 3, as in the version submitted
to the NIST.
Take α ∈ F∗
q2
. The multiplication by α defines a map from Fq2 to itself that
is Fq-linear. So there exists a matrix H(α) such that the corresponding linear
map makes the following diagram commute.
F
2
q F
2
q
Fq2 Fq2
∼=
·α
∼=
H(α)
Analogously, for any λ ∈ F∗
q3
there exist a matrix G(λ) whose corresponding
linear map makes the following diagram commute
F
3
q F
3
q
Fq3 Fq3
∼=
·λ
∼=
G(λ)
Clearly, H(α)−1 = H(α−1) and G(λ)−1 = G(λ−1).
Lemma 1. Let α, β, γ ∈ F∗q2 such that α
E21γE23 = δ ∈ F∗q. Then the private
keys
• (L11, L12, L13, L21, L22, L31, L32)
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• (H(α)L11, H(β)L12, H(γ)L13, L21

 H(αE11βE12)−1 00
0 0 δ−1

 ,
, L22

 δ
−1 0 0
0
0
H(βE23γE33)−1

 , L31, L32)
correspond to the same public key.
Proof. Is a direct consequence of the commutativity of the previous diagrams,
and the fact that
(x1, x2, x3)
E = (y1, y2, y3) =⇒ (αx1, βx2, γx3)
E = (αE11βE12y1, α
E21γE23y2, β
E32γE33y3)
Analogously, we also have
Lemma 2. Let λ, µ ∈ F∗q3 . Then the private keys
• (L11, L12, L13, L21, L22, L31, L32)
• (L11, L12, L13, G(λ)L21, G(µ)L22, L31G(λ
F11µF12)−1, L32G(λ
F21µF22)−1)
produce the same public key.
We can use these facts to assume that the private key has a specific form
Lemma 3. Every valid public key corresponds to a private key that satisfies the
following form:
• L11 =
(
∗ 1
∗ 0
)
• L12 =
(
∗ 1
∗ 0
)
• L13 =
(
∗ a
∗ b
)
with either (a + bT )E23 = 1 + cT for some c ∈ Fq or
(a+ bT )E23 = T
• L21 =

 ∗ ∗ 1∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ 0


• L22 =

 1 ∗ ∗0 ∗ ∗
0 ∗ ∗


where the ∗ symbols represent arbitrary elements of Fq.
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Proof. If it comes from a secret key (L11, L12, L13, L21, L22, L31, L32), we choose
α, β ∈ F∗q2 as follows:
• α is the multiplicative inverse of the element of Fq2 corresponding (via the
isomorphism) to the second column of L11.
• β is the multiplicative inverse of the element of Fq2 corresponding to the
second column of L12.
This way, H(α)L11 =
(
∗ 1
∗ 0
)
and H(β)L12 =
(
∗ 1
∗ 0
)
.
Let τ be the element of Fq2 corresponding to the second column of L13.
Assume that α−E21τE23 = δ + εT with δ 6= 0. Choose γ ∈ F∗q2 such that
αE21γE23 = δ−1 (this can be done easily by raising δ−1α−E21 to the inverse of
E23 modulo q
2 − 1). If H(γ)L13 =
(
∗ a
∗ b
)
, then
(a+ bT )E23 = γE23τE23 = δ−1α−E21τE23 = δ−1(δ + εT ) = 1 + cT
for some c ∈ Fq.
If δ = 0 we can do a similar computation using ε instead of δ, to get that
(a+ bT )E23 = T .
Applying Lemma 1 with α, β, γ ∈ F∗
q2
, we can construct a private key with
L11, L12, L13 as in the statement.
Now choose λ, µ to be the inverse multiplicatives of the elements of Fq3
corresponding to the third column of L21 and the first column of L22 respectively.
Applying Lemma 2 to this new private key we obtain one where L21, L22 are
also as claimed.
4. Recovering information about the special private key from the
public key
In this section we assume that the private key has the form obtained in the
previous section. We show how to compute the unknown coefficients of L1 from
the coefficients in the public key. Moreover, we can also compute six coefficients
from L3.
Let’s start by fixing some notation. Let l11, l12 be the elements of Fq2 that
correspond to the columns of L11. As we have shown in the previous section,
we can assume that l12 = 1. Analogously, l21, l22 and l31, l32 are the elements
of Fq2 that correspond to the columns of L12 and L13, respectively. As before,
we can assume that l22 = 1 and l32 = a+ bT where (a+ bT )
E23 is either 1 + cT
or T .
Define
• f1 + f2T := l11
E21 l31
E23
• g1 + g2T := l11
E21 l32
E23
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• h1 + h2T := l12
E21 l31
E23 = l31
E23
where f1, f2, g1, g2, h1, h2 ∈ Fq.
Lemma 4. Let (η1, η2, η3), (η4, η5, η6) be the first column of L31 and L32 re-
spectively.
If we write the encryption map as a polynomial in x1, . . . , x6, and (a +
bT )E23 = 1+ cT , the terms that only involve the variables x1 and x6 in the i’th
component are
• ηic
F12(xE211 x
E23
6 )
F11+F12 for i = 1, 2, 3
• ηic
F22(xE211 x
E23
6 )
F21+F22 for i = 4, 5, 6.
If (a+ bT )E23 = T there are no terms that only involve these variables.
Similarly, the terms that only involve the variables x1, x5 are
• ηif
F11
1 f
F12
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F11+F12 for i = 1, 2, 3
• ηif
F11
1 f
F12
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F21+F22 for i = 4, 5, 6
Analogous formulas hold for the terms involving x2, x6 and x2, x5, using
g1, g2 and h1, h2 instead of f1, f2 respectively.
Proof. We proof the case for x1, x5, and the rest are done similarly.
Let’s start with the vector (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) and apply the steps of the
encription map. After the first linear map L1, we get a vector formed by stacking
the three vectors L11
(
x1
x2
)
, L12
(
x3
x4
)
and L13
(
x5
x6
)
. The elements of
Fq2 that correspond to these vectors are x1l11+ x2l12, x3l21+x4l22 and x5l31+
x6l32 respectively.
After applying the exponential maps that corresponds to E,we have the
vectors corresponding to
• (x1l11 + x2l12)
E11(x3l21 + x4l22)
E12
• (x1l11 + x2l12)
E21(x5l31 + x6l32)
E23
• (x3l21 + x4l22)
E32(x5l31 + x6l32)
E33
In the expansion of those expressions, there all terms involve variables that
are not x1 or x5 except the in the second one, where there is the term x
E21
1 x
E23
5 l11
E21 l31
E23 .
That is, the vector in F6q that we get at this stage is


• • •
• • •
• • •+ f1x
E21
1 x
E23
5
• • •+ f2x
E21
1 x
E23
5
• • •
• • •


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where the • • • symbols represent sums of terms that don’t involve only the
variables x1 and x5.
After applying L2, we get

• • •+ f1x
E21
1 x
E23
5
• • •
• • •
• • •+ f2x
E21
1 x
E23
5
• • •
• • •


.
Expressed as a vector in F2
q3
, this is
(
• • •+ f1x
E21
1 x
E23
5
• • •+ f2x
E21
1 x
E23
5
)
,
where again,the • • • symbols represent a sum of terms that don’t involve only
x1 and x5, but this time with coefficients in Fq3 , but notice that the coefficients
that only involve x1 and x5 are actually elements of Fq.
Now, applying the exponentiation corresponding to F , we get the vector in
F
2
q3 (
• • •+ fF111 f
F12
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F11+F12
• • •+ fF211 f
F22
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F21+F22
)
,
which corresponds to the vector in F6q


• • •+ fF111 f
F12
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F11+F12
• • •
• • •
• • •+ fF211 f
F22
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F21+F22
• • •
• • •


.
Now, applying L3 we get:


• • •+ fF111 f
F12
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F11+F12η1
• • •+ fF111 f
F12
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F11+F12η2
• • •+ fF111 f
F12
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F11+F12η3
• • •+ fF211 f
F22
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F21+F22η4
• • •+ fF211 f
F22
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F21+F22η5
• • •+ fF211 f
F22
2 (x
E21
1 x
E23
5 )
F21+F22η6


.
5. Recovering the coefficients of L1
Now we see how to recover the coefficients of L1 from the public key.
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Assume c 6= 0 (otherwise, we can detect the case because there are no terms
involving only x1, x6 in the public key; we can apply a linear change of variables
to fall into this case).
From the previous section, we know the following column vectors


cF12η1
cF12η2
cF12η3
cF22η4
cF22η5
cF22η6


,


fF111 f
F12
2 η1
fF111 f
F12
2 η2
fF111 f
F12
2 η3
fF211 f
F22
2 η4
fF211 f
F22
2 η5
fF211 f
F22
2 η6


,


gF111 g
F12
2 η1
gF111 g
F12
2 η2
gF111 g
F12
2 η3
gF211 g
F22
2 η4
gF211 g
F22
2 η5
gF211 g
F22
2 η6


,


hF111 h
F12
2 η1
hF111 h
F12
2 η2
hF111 h
F12
2 η3
hF211 h
F22
2 η4
hF211 h
F22
2 η5
hF211 h
F22
2 η6


.
Taking quotients between them we an eliminate the ηi, and hence we can
know the values of fF111
(
f2
c
)F12
and fF211
(
f2
c
)F22
.
Since the exponentiation map is invertible, these two values allow us to
recover f1 and
f2
c
. Analogously, we can also recover g1,
g2
c
, h1 and
h2
c
.
Let’s denote f ′2 :=
f2
c
, g′2 :=
g2
c
and h′2 :=
h2
c
.
Now we have the equations
f1 + cf
′
2T = f1 + f2T = l11
E21 l31
E23
g1 + cg
′
2T = g1 + g2T = l11
E21(1 + cT )
h1 + ch
′
2T = h1 + h2T = l31
E23
So (f1 + cf
′
2T )(1 + cT ) = (g1 + cg
′
2T )(h1 + ch
′
2T ). In this expression the
only unknown is c. This is an equation in Fq2 that translates into two cuadratic
equations in Fq on c, that must have at least one common nonzero solution.
Note that one of them has no constant term, so one of its solution is zero. That
is, we can determine c completely.
With the value of c, we also get f2, g2 and h2. So we have l31
E23 = h1+h2T .
Raising to the inverse of E23 modulo q
2−1, we recover l31. We can also compute
l11
E21 = f1+f2T
h1+h2T
and hence l11. Moreover, from 1 + cT we can recover a, b such
that (a+bT )E23 = 1+cT , and hence, we have completely recovered the matrices
L11 and L13.
Since we have c and cF12ηi, we can also compute ηi.
Sumarizing, we have proved the following:
Theorem 1. Given a valid public key, there exists a corresponding private key
of the form:
L11 =
(
∗ 1
∗ 0
)
, L12 =
(
? 1
? 0
)
, L13 =
(
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
)
,
L21 =

 ? ? 1? ? 0
? ? 0

 , L22 =

 1 ? ?0 ? ?
0 ? ?


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L31 =

 ∗ ? ?∗ ? ?
∗ ? ?

 , L32 =

 ∗ ? ?∗ ? ?
∗ ? ?


where the coefficients marked as ∗ can be efficiently computed from the public
key.
Notice that, if we could find the two missing coefficients of L12, we would be
able to precompose the map with the inverse of L1, and then with the inverse
of E, leaving us with a map consisting only on a known matrix exponentiation
map composed on both sides with two (partially) unknown linear maps.
6. Recovering L2 and L3
With the previous steps, we would only need to find two missing coefficients
of L12 to reduce the problem to attacking a weaker variant of the scheme, with
the following structure in the case 3, 2:
F
6
q F
6
q F
6
q F
6
q
F
2
q3
F
n
q2
L2
∼=
F
∼=
L3
In this section, we see how to recover the entries of L3 (and then, trivially we
get L2 assuming only that we know the total composition map, and the entries
of F .
Now, denote by ζ1, ζ2, ζ3 the columns of L21, interpreted as elements of Fq3 ,
and by ζ4, ζ5, ζ6 the columns of L22. Analogously, the columns of L
−1
31 and L
−1
32
will be denoted as ϑ1, ϑ2, ϑ3 and ϑ4, ϑ5, ϑ6 respectively. Note that, by the same
kind of arguments used in Section 3, we can assume that ϑ3 = ϑ6 = 1.
If we apply L2 to the vector (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) we get a column vector of the
form (
ζ1
ζ4
)
where ζ1 and ζ4 are considered now as a vector with three coordinates.
Its image by F is
(
ζF111 ζ
F12
4
ζF211 ζ4
F22
)
And the final aplication of L3 gives a vector (z
14
1 , . . . , z
14
6 ), that is known
(since it is just the result of the full map to the starting vector). Applying the
inverse of L3, we get that
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ζF111 ζ
F12
4 = z
14
1 ϑ1 + z
14
2 ϑ2 + z
14
3
ζF211 ζ
F22
4 = z
14
4 ϑ4 + z
14
5 ϑ5 + z
14
6
Analogously, if we start with the vectors (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1),(0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0),
(0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) and apply the
same reasoning, we get the equations:
ζF111 ζ
F12
5 = z
15
1 ϑ1 + z
15
2 ϑ2 + z
15
3
ζF211 ζ
F22
5 = z
15
4 ϑ4 + z
15
5 ϑ5 + z
15
6
ζF111 ζ
F12
6 = z
16
1 ϑ1 + z
16
2 ϑ2 + z
16
3
ζF211 ζ
F22
6 = z
16
4 ϑ4 + z
16
5 ϑ5 + z
16
6
ζF112 ζ
F12
4 = z
24
1 ϑ1 + z
24
2 ϑ2 + z
24
3
ζF212 ζ
F22
4 = z
24
4 ϑ4 + z
24
5 ϑ5 + z
24
6
ζF112 ζ
F12
5 = z
25
1 ϑ1 + z
25
2 ϑ2 + z
25
3
ζF212 ζ
F22
5 = z
25
4 ϑ4 + z
25
5 ϑ5 + z
25
6
ζF112 ζ
F12
6 = z
26
1 ϑ1 + z
26
2 ϑ2 + z
26
3
ζF212 ζ
F22
6 = z
26
4 ϑ4 + z
26
5 ϑ5 + z
26
6
ζF113 ζ
F12
4 = z
34
1 ϑ1 + z
34
2 ϑ2 + z
34
3
ζF213 ζ
F22
4 = z
34
4 ϑ4 + z
34
5 ϑ5 + z
34
6
ζF113 ζ
F12
5 = z
35
1 ϑ1 + z
35
2 ϑ2 + z
35
3
ζF213 ζ
F22
5 = z
35
4 ϑ4 + z
35
5 ϑ5 + z
35
6
ζF113 ζ
F12
6 = z
36
1 ϑ1 + z
36
2 ϑ2 + z
36
3
ζF213 ζ
F22
6 = z
36
4 ϑ4 + z
36
5 ϑ5 + z
36
6
where the z
(ij)
k are known values of Fq, and the ζi and ϑj are unknown
elements of Fq3 . The same system of equations could be obtained by following
track of the coefficients in the polynomial expression, instead of evaluating in
particular values (both results would be equivalent).
What we need to do now is to solve this system of equations, for which
we know that some solution exists. Moreover, we know that (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) are
Fq-lineally independent, and so are (ζ4, ζ5, ζ6), (ϑ1, ϑ2, ϑ3) and (ϑ4, ϑ5, ϑ6). In
particular, none of those elements is zero.
Doing some basic elimination of the ζi variables, we get some simpler sub-
systems of equations, for example,
(z141 ϑ1 + z
14
2 ϑ2 + z
14
3 )(z
25
1 ϑ1 + z
25
2 ϑ2 + z
25
3 ) = (z
15
1 ϑ1 + z
15
2 ϑ2 + z
15
3 )(z
24
1 ϑ1 + z
24
2 ϑ2 + z
24
3 )
(z141 ϑ1 + z
14
2 ϑ2 + z
14
3 )(z
26
1 ϑ1 + z
26
2 ϑ2 + z
26
3 ) = (z
16
1 ϑ1 + z
16
2 ϑ2 + z
16
3 )(z
24
1 ϑ1 + z
24
2 ϑ2 + z
24
3 )
which is a system of two cuadratic equations in the variables ϑ1, ϑ2. It can
be easily solved by taking a resultant (which is a degree 4 polynomial in just
one variable) and then factoring it over Fq3 . We will get at least one solution
(since we know that one solution must exist) and at most four possible ones.
Note that there are more possible systems of two cuadratic equations on
the same variables, so the whole system is overdetermined. We can use that to
discard some of the four possible solutions.
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Analogously, we can solve for ϑ4, ϑ5. Then, solving for ζ1, . . . ζ6 can be done
just by applying the inverse of F .
Once we get all the values ϑi and ζj , we have effectively recovered the private
key.
7. Conclusion
We have presented a structural attack to the DME cryptosystem with pa-
rameters (3, 2, q), that is able to recover the full private key from the public key
and two extra elements of Fq that deppend on the private key. An exhaustive
search gives an upper bound of q2 to the security level. In particular, for the
DME (3, 2, 248) version submitted to the NIST, this bound gives at most 96 bits
of security, far less than the required 256 bits.
The attack only uses a very small fraction of the information contained in
the public key. So we suspect that a deeper analysis could provide a better
method than the exhaustive search for the full recovery of the private key.
Further research would be needed to determine if other choices of parameters
are vulnerable to similar attacks.
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